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STR ATEGIC FEATURES OF THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA
A Tough Neighborhood for Hegemons
James R. Holmes

T

he South China Sea is a semienclosed sea at the intersection between East
Asia and the Indian Ocean region. It exhibits characteristics similar to the
Mediterranean Sea and the Caribbean Sea, as well as some revealing differences.
Both the similarities and the differences commend sea-power theorist Alfred
Thayer Mahan’s analysis of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea to presentday students and practitioners of maritime strategy. Mahan classified strategic
features—especially prospective sites for naval stations—by their positions,
strengths, and resources. This article adds a metric to his analytical template,
namely, the state of relations with countries that host naval bases. He applied
much the same framework to narrow seas, such as international straits, while
also sizing up these passages’ widths, lengths, and difficulty of transit. Here too
an element warrants adding, namely, the underwater terrain—its topography and
hydrography.
This modified template allows for exhaustive analysis of geostrategic features.
Mahanian methods retain their potency not just for evaluating enclosed seas and
adjacent littorals but also for assessing the value of maritime strategic features
wherever they may be found. This article investiJames Holmes is professor of strategy at the U.S. gates Mahan’s methodology; applies it to maritime
Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over
Southeast Asia, examining the sea and its islands,
the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S.
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dimension, and crucial differences separating
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the South China Sea from other marginal seas;
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and urges those who do business in great waters to embrace this instrument for
general use.
WHY THE SOUTH CHINA SEA?
What would Mahan think about the strategic geography of the South China Sea?
One thing is certain—that he would think about it were he alive today. How could
he not? Journalist Robert Kaplan calls the South China Sea “the 21st century’s defining battleground,” the “throat of global sea routes.”1 China seemingly covets a
hegemonic position there, having repeatedly asserted “indisputable sovereignty”
over virtually the entire expanse while conducting itself as though it intends to
create a closed sea.2 And it is moving to match purpose with power, constructing
a great navy, deploying its first unified coast guard, and providing fire support
for the sea services through such shore-based sea-denial weaponry as antiship
cruise and ballistic missiles and missile-armed tactical aircraft, submarines, and
patrol craft.
Beijing’s claims to sovereignty over this vast realm are far from indisputable.
But—backed up by this panoply of military hardware and the advantages that
accrue to those defending their home turf—they might prove irresistible. China’s
naval rise is a crucial factor prompting the United States to “pivot” or “rebalance”
to the western Pacific and Indian Ocean. As early as 2007, U.S. sea-service chiefs
pledged to stage “credible combat power” in the two oceans for the foreseeable
future.3
Geopolitical thinkers explain why. The South China Sea belongs to what Yale
professor Nicholas Spykman terms the “girdle of marginal seas” swaddling the
Eurasian mainland. For Spykman, dominating such marginal seas is crucial to
projecting power into the Eurasian rimlands and thence into the vast interior. As
Kaplan notes, this potentially contested body of water is also an interface joining
the two oceans constituting the “Indo-Pacific” region.4 Seagoing forces routinely
traverse it, alighting around the Asian perimeter as strategic circumstances warrant. Strategic mobility would be slower and clumsier absent free transit through
Southeast Asian waters. Freedom of the seas constitutes a mainstay of U.S. foreign
policy in any event, but it is increasingly a matter of operational expediency as well.
Maritime strategy is not all about great powers, however. Lesser Southeast
Asian states seek to advance their interests, consonant with the meager physical strength they can muster. They can also reach out for support, aggregating
their strength to counterbalance China. The United States is a balancer of first
resort. Asian powers like Japan, India, and Australia, furthermore, have voiced
interest in free passage through regional seaways, while consulting among themselves about maritime matters. The increasingly obvious intersection between
Southeast Asian geography and politics would fix Mahan’s strategic eye on the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/5
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region—much as he peered southward toward the Caribbean and Gulf during
his own lifetime.
THROUGH A MAHANIAN LOOKING GLASS
By consulting Mahan’s works on American geopolitics, observers can glean
some idea of what he would say about strategic competition in Southeast Asia
were he alive today. That naval historian compared the Caribbean Sea and Gulf
of Mexico to the Mediterranean Sea in hopes of deriving insights into strategic
effectiveness in semienclosed expanses. He saw “a very marked analogy in many
respects” between the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas—“an analogy which
will be still closer if a Panama canal-route ever be completed,” allowing east–west
transit and shortening communications between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
by thousands of miles.5
The logic Mahan articulated for America’s Mediterranean holds for any aspiring sea power that possesses the economic vitality, military strength, and political
resolve—the lineaments of great power—to make use of important strategic features in or adjoining the South China Sea.6 Even small marine states can deploy
artful strategy to deny geographic assets to stronger rivals or to exploit these
assets themselves. Indeed, strategic guile is all the more important for the weak.
An expansive view of such matters came naturally to Mahan, a philosopher
of sea power as well as a naval strategist.7 Nowadays it is distressingly commonplace for strategists to reduce him to a propagandist, a Gilbert-and-Sullivanesque
figure touting Trafalgar-like battles between swarms of armored dreadnoughts.8
Decisive sea battle was a part of his writings, to be sure, but not the whole—and
arguably not even the most important part. For him, vouchsafes historian William Livezey, “sea power was the sum total of forces and factors, tools and geographical circumstances, which operated to gain command of the sea, to secure
its use for oneself and to deny that use to the enemy.”9 Quite so. There is more to
sea power than tactics or specific implements of sea combat.
Rather, Mahan conceived of sea power as a symbiosis among domestic industry and foreign trade and commerce, commercial and naval shipping, and forward
bases to support the journeys of fuel-thirsty steamships.10 “Commercial value,” he
wrote, “cannot be separated from military in sea strategy, for the greatest interest
of the sea is commerce.”11 In today’s parlance, gaining and enforcing commercial,
political, and military “access” to regions like East Asia constituted his paramount
goal. The “starting point and foundation” for comprehending sea power are “the
necessity to secure commerce, by political measures conducive to military, or
naval strength. This order is that of actual relative importance to the nation of the
three elements—commercial, political, military.”12 Commercial access, then, held
pride of place in his thinking. This is a vision of grand-strategic sweep.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 32

3

2/14/14 1:08 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 5

HOLMES

33

Mahan was acutely conscious of geography. He examined specific theaters
more attentively than did the other greats of strategic theory, except perhaps his
“best military friend,” land-power scribe Antoine-Henri Jomini.13 Indeed, some
pundits pronounce Mahan a seafaring Baron Jomini.14 Both Clausewitz and Sun
Tzu, for instance, pay considerable attention to terrain only in a generic way.
Neither goes into detail about the geographic characteristics of any particular
battleground or theater.
For Mahan, studying the particular geographic surroundings is a prerequisite
for competitive enterprises. He proclaims that “geography underlies strategy.”15
Many principles of continental warfare map to the sea, moreover, applying there
much as they do ashore. This renders the feats of land-power giants like Frederick
the Great and Napoleon Bonaparte worthy objects of study, even for mariners.
Mahan delights in quoting or paraphrasing Napoleon’s maxim that “war is a business of positions.” He does so four times in Naval Strategy (1911), his last major
work—a work specifically meant to tease out the likenesses between land and sea
warfare.
So geographic analysis comes first, at sea as on land. When pondering the
opening of an oceanic theater, affirms Mahan, makers of strategy must begin by
surveying its physical characteristics. To design and prosecute strategy, they must
evaluate geographic features, determine which are critical and which secondary,
and integrate important features into their plans along with maritime forces able
to shape events. “In considering any theater of actual or possible war, or of a prospective battlefield,” he insists, “the first and most essential thing is to determine
what position, or chain of positions, by their natural and inherent advantages
affect control of the greatest part of it.”16 Where to station forces to assert—or
deny—control of key positions constitutes “a matter of prime importance” for any
power that covets access to faraway expanses.17
Geography constitutes the fixed setting within which maritime strategy—a dynamic, intensely interactive human enterprise—unfolds. Yet Mahan went beyond
general entreaties to afford geography its due. During his long publishing career,
he constructed a framework for analyzing the worth of such strategic features as
seaports, islands, and narrow waterways. His first book explored The Gulf and
Inland Waters (1883).18 He returned to this subject in “The Strategic Features
of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea,” a Harper’s essay reprinted in The
Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future (1897).19 Naval Strategy, as
suggested above, concentrates single-mindedly on unearthing points of similarity
and difference between continental and maritime warfare.
Interestingly, his most influential work, The Influence of Sea Power upon
History, 1660–1783, contains the least geographic content, beyond the general
axiom that the extent and conformation of territory are two of the six inescapable
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/5
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determinants of maritime might. That few readers venture beyond The Influence
of Sea Power upon History may help explain strategists’ habit of overlooking the
geopolitical dimension of his writings.
Where do likely theaters of competition and conflict lie? Mahan casts this
question in terms of purpose and power. He observes that certain regions, “rich
by nature and important both commercially and politically, but politically insecure, compel the attention and excite the jealousies of more powerful nations.”20
Regions combining abundant natural resources and vibrant trade and commerce
with frail governments unable to resist great-power encroachment beguile
acquisitive foreign powers. Ambitious outsiders see great reward in obtaining
military and economic beachheads in such regions, and they see the barriers to
entry as low. Mahan was thinking of the great-power struggle over Manchuria
and the Korean Peninsula. Northeast Asia was a crucible of conflict during the
Sino-Japanese War (1894–95), the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), and Japan’s
annexation of Korea (1910), great events that transpired during his lifetime.
How did Mahan estimate the strategic value of geographic positions? As noted
before, he considered overseas naval stations to be collectively one of three pillars
of sea power. External powers, he held, must be choosy about the sites they select,
lest they disperse forces too thinly and expose their navies to piecemeal defeat
in wartime. Mahan proposed that “the strategic value of any position, be it body
of land large or small, or a seaport, or a strait, depends, 1, upon situation (with
reference chiefly to communications), 2, upon its strength (inherent or acquired),
and, 3, upon its resources (natural or stored).”21 As noted at the outset of this
article, relations with prospective host governments constitute a de facto fourth
determinant, or enabler, of a site’s value. Absent decent working relations, a port
will remain off-limits, along with its geostrategic leverage.
Suitably amended, Mahan’s simple construct retains its analytical power today.
Consider its elements in turn. First, in maritime strategy as in real estate, location ranks atop the priorities list. To be worth occupying, prospective bases must
lie along “strategic lines.” Otherwise, innate strength and resources matter little.
Harbors near heavily trafficked sea lines of communication (SLOCs) are ideal,
placing the fleet close to its sphere of action. Proximity to friendly seaports is another advantage. It allows fleet detachments to combine for defensive or offensive
action in wartime, rendering mutual support. Proximity to hostile naval stations
allows squadrons to watch or interdict enemy movements.
Isolation, on the other hand, detracts from a position’s value. Even Gibraltar
would be worthless as a naval station, despite its unsurpassed natural defenses,
if situated alongside waters devoid of merchant and naval traffic.22 A fleet based
there would find little to do. Nor would anyone see any point in attacking the
harbor. Stout defenses would be moot. Nor can a sea power do much about
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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ill-positioned features. “Strength and resources,” observes Mahan, “may be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to move a port which
lies outside the limits of strategic effect.”23 Natural defenses can be augmented to
a degree, or resources can be shipped in overland or overseas. Position is eternal.
Second, a seaport needs military strength, or defensibility, to fend off maritime
or landward assault while projecting naval force outward. A squadron stationed at
a base capable of protecting itself can prowl the seas independently, executing its
missions confident that its landward refuge will be there when it returns. Rugged
natural defenses are desirable. Cliffs overlooking seaward approaches, for instance, render amphibious assault unpalatable while letting defenders rain gunfire
on an enemy fleet. Defenders can emplace guns on both sides of a narrow harbor
mouth, creating overlapping fields of fire. Hence Lord Nelson’s quip that a ship’s
a fool to fight a fort. If a base lacks inherent protection against attack, naval engineers must fortify it—or look elsewhere for a more defensible site. Defensibility is
especially complex in this age of missile warfare. Hardening infrastructure against
missile strikes from the sea demands expensive, labor-intensive measures. The
proliferation of inexpensive antiship weaponry, on the other hand, can augment
the striking power of bases. Truck-launched antiship missiles, furthermore, can
be positioned along the coast or well inland, converting the littoral zone into a de
facto fortress.24 How the offense-defense balance is likely to play out is a question
worth asking when appraising a seaport’s defensibility.
Third, “resources” refers to shipyards to refit merchantmen and ships of war,
provisions for visiting ships, and goods to supply the residents of the port. Foodstuffs, fuel, spare parts, and ammunition are only some of the items a base needs.
Self-supporting ports are ideal. Large islands and coastal harbors boasting ample
backcountry can provide for many of their needs. Sites without such endowments
must ship in cargoes of critical goods. Dependence on external supplies exposes
the port and fleet to a naval quarantine. Observes Mahan, resource-poor Gibraltar would wilt without seaborne supplies—its peerless strategic position and
defenses notwithstanding.25 Its relationship with the Royal Navy was symbiotic:
warships based there could control access to the Mediterranean Sea, but ship
crews and the inhabitants of the fortress would starve unless the fleet ruled the
waves, assuring regular shipments.
Transpose this analysis to the Caribbean and Gulf. (Use map 1 as a reference
during the following discussion.) Mahan warns against gauging a site’s potential
in isolation from its surroundings. This is especially true within the cramped
confines of “America’s Mediterranean.” Islands, he notes, constitute a nearly solid
barrier between the Gulf and Caribbean. Cuba, Santo Domingo (i.e., Hispaniola),
and Puerto Rico are the primary obstacles. Narrow seas separating the islands
corral shipping bound to or from the Isthmus of Panama into three principal
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/5
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MAP 1
GULF OF MEXICO AND CARIBBEAN SEA

Source: Mahan, Interest of America in Sea Power, Present and Future, p. 270.

shipping lanes. One, through the Yucatán Channel, passes to Cuba’s west. The
second route, the Windward Passage, lies between the eastern tip of Cuba and
Haiti. Because Cuba faces these two waterways (the third passes well to the south,
skirting past Puerto Rico), concludes Mahan, it is “as surely the key to the Gulf of
Mexico as Gibraltar is to the Mediterranean.”26
But as he notes, Cuba commands manifold advantages over Gibraltar in terms
of strength and resources. Its attributes include a long, distended shape, multiple
harbors, and abundant indigenous resources. Defenders operating in the interior could resupply harbors like Havana and Santiago overland, defying even an
overpowering blockade fleet. Best of all from a Mahanian standpoint, the United
States had won basing rights at Guantánamo Bay, near Cuba’s eastern tip, through
its victory in the Spanish-American War (1898). U.S. Navy forces stationed there
stood athwart sea communications with the British-held island of Jamaica to the
south. This positional advantage over the Royal Navy was no small thing, since
the Royal Navy had ruled American waters until around the turn of the century
and Anglo-American war remained a hypothetical possibility.
Puerto Rico, another prize wrung from Spain, likewise occupied a strategic
position. As noted before, the third of Mahan’s major SLOCs, the Anegada Passage, lay to its east.27 U.S. Navy warships operating from the island had the option
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014
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of interdicting adversary shipping along this route or safeguarding the island and
adjacent waters for friendly use. In short, its post-1898 island holdings empowered the United States to mount a forward defense of its Gulf coast, entrenched
U.S. naval forces in a central position astride important shipping lanes, and granted Washington the option of radiating power southward toward the isthmus.
Amassing the wherewithal to mold events on and around the isthmus obsessed
navalists like Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, and Henry Cabot Lodge. After all, an
entirely new sea passage would connect Atlantic with Pacific once engineers finished digging the canal across Panama. Transoceanic passage would spare ships
the long cruise around Cape Horn. In geospatial terms, observes Spykman, the
“cut through Central America had the effect of turning the whole of the United
States around on its axis and giving it direct access to the Pacific Ocean.” In effect,
the artificial waterway teleported New York nearer to the Asia-Pacific, closer than
Liverpool is to Shanghai, an invaluable edge for American merchantmen. New
York was also thousands of sea miles closer to the west coast of North America.28
Controlling Central American waters, consequently, became a goal of surpassing importance for Washington during the age of Mahan. Where should the U.S.
Navy position forces to command these waters? The interdependence among
such sites as Pensacola, Key West, and Guantánamo Bay complicated geostrategic
calculations. Some sites, writes Mahan, were “overshadowed by others so near
and so strong as practically to embrace them.”29
When weighing the comparative merits of Jamaica and Cuba, for instance, he
pointed out that Jamaica “flanks all lines of communications.” Judged purely by
its geographic position, the British-held island commanded the greatest potential
of any geostrategic asset in the Caribbean Sea. Yet it was deficient in resources
and thus dependent on shipments brought in by sea from Canada or the British
Isles. Cuba overshadowed Jamaica, controlling all sea communications between
the Atlantic Ocean and the lesser island. Only a fleet stronger than any hostile
fleet based in Cuba could prevent a distant blockade from isolating and slowly
starving out Jamaica. Only a dominant navy could imbue Jamaica with the full
value it commanded in abstract calculations, whereas Cuba was virtually selfsufficient.30 By the turn of the century, the Royal Navy could outmatch the U.S.
Navy in American waters only by pulling squadrons from other important theaters. Advantage: Washington.
Mahan expands in Naval Strategy on his position/strength/resources template, applying it to straits and other confined waterways as well as to islands and
coastal sites. He also adds three metrics peculiar to narrow seas. “The military
importance of such passages or defiles,” he says, “depends not only upon the
geographical position, but also upon their width, length, and difficulty.” More
specifically, a strait is a “strategic point” whose value depends on its “situation”
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/5
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on the nautical chart; on its “strength, which may be defined to consist in the
obstacles it puts in the way of an assailant and the consequent advantages to the
holder”; and on “resources or advantages, such as the facility it gives the possessor
for reaching a certain point.” A well-placed passage shortens the distance from
place to place for the belligerent who holds it.31 Denying an enemy fleet passage
forces it to follow longer, more circuitous, and probably more debilitating and
costly routes to its destination.
As in his analysis of bases, Mahan cautions against evaluating narrow seas
without accounting for their larger geographic contexts. When “fixing the value
of any passage,” it is crucial to calculate the number and availability of nearby
alternatives. “If so situated that a long circuit is imposed upon the belligerent who
is deprived of its use, its value is enhanced.” Scarcity magnifies a waterway’s importance. Its value rises if it constitutes “the only close link between two bodies of
water, or two naval stations.” Finally, he urges strategists to consider the underwater topography of narrow seas. There is a vertical dimension to Mahan’s analysis,
then, even though he was concerned mainly with surface shipping. The presence
of convoluted channels, shallow water, or shoal water helps determine a passage’s
offensive and defensive potentials.32 A hard-to-navigate passage represents an asset to the defender, a bane to opponents unfamiliar with its intricacies and quirks.
Finally, Mahan notes in passing that “a certain regard must be had to political
conditions, which may be said to a great extent to neutralize some positions.”
Social or political upheaval in the surrounding country, for example, can work
against or even negate a site’s value, undercutting its defensibility or impoverishing even a wealth of resources. Mahan dismissed Haiti as a base for just that
reason. The country’s constant revolutionary upheaval, or sociopolitical “nothingness,” rendered it “an inert obstacle” to U.S. maritime strategy.33
Such comments about social, cultural, and political context have the feel of
an afterthought for Mahan. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that there are
diplomatic indexes of geostrategic merit. Position, strength, and resources are
not everything for a base. Learning the cultural terrain can be just as crucial. Alliance relations, then, belong in the Mahanian framework as an additional metric.
Today, strong nations no longer wrest choice pieces of territory from their owners
to use as bases. It is imperative, consequently, to take account of prospective host
nations’ interests and views—lest their governments restrict or refuse access in
stressful times.
The best-situated, most defensible, most lavishly supplied seaport in the world
means little if it remains off-limits when needed most. Alliance management represents an enabler for any forward-leaning maritime strategy, letting a seagoing
state tap bases’ physical potential.
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Now apply this framework—position, strength, resources, and alliance relations
for land sites, while adding length, width, difficulty, and underwater topography
for narrow seas—to the South China Sea. (Refer to map 2.) This is a body of water
similar in crucial respects to the Caribbean and Gulf, just as those semienclosed
seas bore enough resemblance to the Mediterranean Sea to make Mahan’s comparative study worthwhile.
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The South China Sea presents operational surroundings that appear more
hospitable for navies than do other semienclosed expanses of comparable size, yet
are less hospitable in other respects. It is wider and more vacant than the Mediterranean or the combined Gulf and Caribbean, facilitating free passage for commercial and naval shipping while allowing naval task forces ample maneuvering
space. No obstacles comparable to the Italian Peninsula jut into it to constrict
navigation. No island barrier comparable to the Cuba–Hispaniola–Puerto Rico
line funnels shipping bound for the Malacca Strait—the main outlet to the Indian
Ocean beyond—through a few focal points that can be guarded by watchful maritime forces (or bedeviled by pirates or other nonstate scourges).
For ships that are simply passing through the region in peacetime, then, the
South China Sea is a readily navigable expanse. Only a handful of mostly tiny
islands, atolls, and reefs—the Spratly Islands to the south, the Paracel Islands to
the north—break up the largely featureless maritime plain that separates Vietnam
from the Philippines along the east–west axis and Hong Kong from Borneo from
north to south. The Spratlys and Paracels command enviable geographic positions, but they feature next to nothing in terms of the benchmarks of strength and
resources. Many are uninhabited, habitable only if outside supplies are brought
in. At most these small, resource-impoverished, hard-to-defend islets could play
host to small units armed with antiship cruise missiles, providing the force that
occupies them a sea-denial option vis-à-vis passing merchant or naval traffic.
These are tenuous positions for military forces in search of forward bases.
In short, it will prove hard for any Southeast Asian naval power to ensconce
itself in a central position comparable to the one the United States occupied after
wresting away Spain’s island empire. There is no Puerto Rico, let alone a Cuba.
Two islands figure prominently in news dispatches from Southeast Asia. The first
is Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratlys. This asset is held by Taiwan. The second is Woody Island, or Yongxing Island, a Chinese-held outpost in the Paracels.
Beijing recently instituted the administrative center of Sansha, on Yongxing, to
buttress its claim to sovereignty over most of the South China Sea. Both islands
resemble Jamaica, as Mahan described it, but they lack Jamaica’s resource base.
Both hold good positions, then, but are short on strength and resources. Neither
is a self-sufficient, readily defensible Cuba.
Consider. Taiping is the largest of the Spratly Islands, at 1.4 kilometers long and
0.4 wide. These are flyspeck proportions. It is the only one of the Spratlys with its
own freshwater. It is big enough for an airfield. Accordingly, Taipei has equipped
the island with an airstrip capable of handling military aircraft and is mulling extending the runway to permit larger aircraft to land.34 In terms of position, Taiping
is well situated along SLOCs connecting the Strait of Malacca with Northeast Asia.
Beyond that, it makes a precarious base. Plentiful freshwater is a significant asset,
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but ships or aircraft would have to ferry in foodstuffs, ammunition, and other
supplies from Taiwan, through potentially contested sea or air routes, to support
any serious expeditionary presence in the South China Sea.
Without sea control or air supremacy—operational conditions increasingly
out of reach for Taiwan’s outmatched air force and navy—Taiping Island will fall
in any serious conflict.35 As in the case of Jamaica, only a dominant naval and
air force can impart value to the island. Taiping would be an asset to Chinese sea
power in Southeast Asia, since People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces can hope
to rule the seas and skies, but it does little for Taiwan in military terms. The same
is even truer for the other, even weaker claimants to the Spratlys.36 At most the
island holds negative value for Taipei—that is, withholding it from China works
in favor of China’s competitors, simply because it keeps the PLA from emplacing
forces there in peacetime.
Woody Island, which anchors China’s presence in the Paracels, holds still less
intrinsic military value. As noted before, Beijing founded the city of Sansha there
in July 2012 while announcing plans to garrison the island.37 Like Taiping, Woody
Island occupies an excellent geographic position. Also like Taiping, it is woefully
deficient in strength and resources. It is minuscule. It boasts no freshwater, meaning the very basics of life must be shipped in from the mainland. Sansha is little
more than a village, populated by a thousand or so residents. The garrison will be
a token force, with more symbolic power than combat potential.
Even so, Chinese military predominance in the northern reaches of the South
China Sea bestows more potential on Woody Island than Taiping will ever enjoy
under Taiwanese control. Its capacity to sustain air and sea communications lets
the PLA unlock whatever potential the island holds. In Mahanian parlance, it
equates to a Jamaica that is home to a preponderant fleet and depends on that
fleet for defense and sustenance. Clearly, from a military standpoint, the South
China Sea islands are an unpromising lot. Yet China is best positioned to take
advantage of what little they offer.
The South China Sea Rim: Part Solid, Part Porous
If not island strongholds, what about ports and airfields around the South China
Sea rim? As detailed before, no sea power can easily mount a forward presence
in the islands. There is no Cuba, Puerto Rico, or Saint Thomas from which to
stage forward operations. Nor are there counterparts to Gibraltar, Malta, or other
Mediterranean outposts where Royal Navy ships tarried during Britain’s imperial
heyday. Hainan Island extends China’s seaward reach, but only by some 233 kilometers from the mainland coast. Converting Woody Island into a serious asset
might be worth China’s while but promises to consume significant resources and
policy energy.
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Because of these shortcomings, sites around the periphery take on more importance than in Mahan’s Gulf and Caribbean. Southeast Asian states are increasingly willing to open their facilities to outsiders. Manila, for instance, has welcomed U.S. ship visits in increasing numbers since China occupied Scarborough
Shoal, an atoll deep within the Philippine exclusive economic zone, in 2012. Cam
Ranh Bay, a U.S.-built seaport in southern Vietnam, offers an excellent harbor
astride the eastern approaches to the Strait of Malacca. Hanoi has opened the
port to shipping from all nations.38 Changi, a port facility in Singapore, can berth
U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, not to mention smaller craft. Singapore
recently agreed to host a rotating four-ship squadron of U.S. Navy littoral combat
ships, while making it known that all navies are welcome to call there.39 The first
littoral combat ship commenced its maiden deployment in early 2013.
Neither Vietnam nor Singapore is likely to permit full-fledged foreign bases
on its territory, but both appear amenable to less formal arrangements. How governments size up the strategic setting represents the crucial determinant of their
policies toward foreign navies. The more aggressively China pushes its maritime
territorial claims in Southeast Asia, in other words, the more receptive regional
governments are likely to be to hosting outside forces. Position, strength, and
resources are meaningless without access. Access is a function of international
politics and, in turn, of whether governments perceive menace in the geostrategic
environment and seek outside support.
There being few permanent basing options in the southern reaches of the
South China Sea, ships capable of at-sea replenishment—indispensable to sustained operations on the high seas—will be central to any maritime competition.
This helps account for Beijing’s determined pursuit of aircraft carriers, the best
mobile substitute for forward airfields. One suspects the People’s Liberation
Army will also step up efforts to field tanker aircraft and combat-logistics vessels.
Doing so will help combat platforms remain on scene in or over southern waters,
rendering the Chinese presence there less sporadic than was once the case. The
PLA Navy, moreover, has fielded Type 056 corvettes to help establish a standing
presence in disputed expanses. Such platforms will supplement the white hulls of
the China Coast Guard. In short, material capabilities must compensate for the
dearth of forward positions in the region.
Ingress and Egress Points
What about access to and from maritime Southeast Asia? The frontiers of the
South China Sea bear closer resemblance to the frontiers of the Gulf and Caribbean than to those of the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean is a true middle sea,
enclosed entirely by continental landmasses, apart from the Strait of Gibraltar,
the Dardanelles and Bosporus, and the Suez Canal, an artificial waterway. The
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South China Sea, similarly, is ringed by continental Southeast Asia, a solid barrier
to the north and west. Island states, however, form its eastern and southern periphery. This massive arc sweeps from the Taiwan Strait to the Strait of Malacca,
passing through Taiwan, the Philippines, Borneo, and the Indonesian Archipelago along the way. The South China Sea’s eastern borders, then, are far more
permeable than any found in the Mediterranean, albeit less so than the Lesser
Antilles, which make up the southeastern arc of the Caribbean Sea.
In contrast to the case with the Panama Canal, furthermore, mariners have
alternatives to the Malacca Strait—in particular, the Lombok and Sunda Straits,
navigable seaways that pierce the southern arc of the Indonesian Archipelago. A
glance at the map suggests that with so many access points, shipping can enter
and exit the South China Sea with little fear of interference. In his review of
Caribbean geography, similarly, Mahan contends that the Antilles present few
impediments to shipping despite their auspicious position on the map.40 Indeed,
the southeastern fringes of the Caribbean verge on being open sea.
But naval technology has come a long way since Mahan’s day. Properly armed
and fortified, local militaries could contest adversaries’ use of nearby straits with
relative ease. A mix of fast attack craft, land-based antiship missiles, and underwater mines—perhaps even submarines, for some navies—could give them the
dominant say over wartime transit through these narrow seas. Archipelagoes can
be made formidable barriers.
Local Sea Powers May Punch Above Their Weight
Strategists today cannot simplify the geometry of South China Sea maritime
strategy as neatly as Mahan simplified that of the Caribbean basin. Weak Southeast Asian countries are better positioned and equipped to influence their neighborhoods than were weak American states during the fin de siècle era. As map 1
shows, Mahan was able to inscribe a triangle on his map enclosing all important
geostrategic features found in the inland seas. A line connecting New Orleans
with Colón formed one side. A second side originated at Pensacola and runs
through, and somewhat beyond, Saint Thomas. The final leg started at Colón
and runs through Cartagena and Curaçao, intersecting with the Pensacola–Saint
Thomas leg east of Martinique. Everything outside could be safely excluded from
consideration.
Mahan cited two reasons why strategists could concentrate their analytical
energies within this triangle. One, applying the position/strength/resources
paradigm revealed that there was no seaport of consequence along the desolate
coastline stretching westward from New Orleans, along the Texas and Mexican
coasts, through the northern tip of the Yucatán Peninsula. Two, Mexico was
politically stable and deployed no serious navy. It presented no threat, actual

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss2/5

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 43

14

2/14/14 1:08 PM

44

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Holmes: Strategic Features of the South China Sea: A Tough Neighborhood f

or latent. Strategists could afford to disregard the shores west of the Mississippi
delta, because it was inert from a sea-power standpoint. By default, all significant
features lay within the Mahanian triangle.41
Geostrategists today cannot discount the potential of Southeast Asian states
as blithely as Mahan discounted Mexico’s a century ago. The entire South China
Sea rim merits scrutiny. True, China boasts the most maritime potential of any
littoral state in the region—by a wide margin. But unlike Latin American states
of the Mahanian age, Southeast Asian states are not mere objects on which great
powers work their will. They can influence their marine environs. Inexpensive
shore-based weaponry can project force out to sea, harnessing the logic of sea
denial even absent powerful fleets.
Not that the region is devoid of respectable fleets. Some states, like Singapore,
sport small yet first-rate navies. Singaporean mariners are reputed for their skill
and élan, and they operate quality platforms and weaponry. This translates into
a measure of control over the approaches to Malacca, as well as the strait itself.
Others, notably Vietnam, have set out to field viable maritime forces of their
own. Hanoi is acquiring six top-flight, Kilo-class diesel submarines from Russia,
furnishing its navy a sea-denial option even vis-à-vis the far stronger PLA Navy.42
A Vietnamese Kilo squadron could contest Beijing’s claims to sovereignty—
control, in other words—over regional waters while complicating the PLA Navy’s
efforts to exploit the full potential of its submarine base on Hainan or its outpost on Woody Island. A stealthy Kilo lying off, say, Hainan could deter traffic
from entering or leaving port, compelling Chinese mariners to undertake timeconsuming antisubmarine measures simply to use their Sanya base.
Indonesia too has announced plans to beef up its maritime power.43 Even the
Philippines, despite a trivial defense budget, has options in the form of a longstanding mutual-defense pact with the United States and a history of playing
host to powerful U.S. sea and air forces. Manila has sought American backing
during recent encounters with Beijing, notably the spring 2012 imbroglio at
Scarborough Shoal.44 American ships have called at Philippine ports more and
more often since. The analogy between the South China Sea, with its lopsided
naval balance, and the Mediterranean Sea, for centuries an arena of strife among
more or less evenly matched naval powers, is closer than that between the South
China Sea and the Caribbean of Mahan’s day. It could be a hazardous expanse
indeed in times of trouble.
The Undersea Dimension
The undersea dimension seems like an afterthought in Mahan’s analysis of narrow seas, presumably because Mahan conducted his analysis before submarines
had fulfilled their potential. For him the primary concern is that seamounts,
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reefs, and other obstructions can narrow the choice of courses for ships cruising
on the surface. Careless piloting could leave a surface vessel aground. Such perils persist. In 2013, for example, the mine countermeasures ship USS Guardian
(MCM 5) foundered on a reef in the Sulu Sea and had to be broken up.45
Yet underwater topography is at least as crucial for submarines cruising the
depths. A passage’s underwater conformation may differ markedly from that on
the surface, meaning that submarines may have to trace a somewhat different
route to make their way through. They also might have to traverse channels in
shallow water, exposing themselves to detection and tracking. This is an uncomfortable prospect for submarine crews, who thrive on concealment. In Mahanian
parlance, then, a passage’s width, length, and difficulty may be different for submarines than for surface craft. Submarines resemble ground forces in that the
terrain beneath them matters—in shallow zones, at any rate.
Not just physical features, furthermore, but a host of variables relating to seawater itself—temperature and salinity, to name two—influence sound propagation, which is central to submarine and antisubmarine operations. Acoustics and
kindred subjects are absent from Mahan’s works yet shape undersea warfare to a
striking degree. It would be worth undertaking a close study of South China Sea
subsurface topography and hydrography, compiling an undersea counterpart to
his analysis of features with which surface navies must contend. Navies increasingly crowd these waters with advanced submarines, rendering water-space management ever more difficult, while raising the prospect of accidents and incidents
beneath the waves. This warrants study.
One sample question: How will Chinese ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs)
based at Sanya, on Hainan Island, reach patrol grounds in the western Pacific
should Beijing choose to send them out? To maintain stealth, SSBNs would first
have to evade any adversary picket submarines lying offshore. Once in deep water, they would cruise eastward toward the Philippines. In all likelihood Chinese
boats would exit through the Luzon Strait, the narrow sea between Taiwan and
the Philippine island of Luzon.
Or, more precisely, maritime geography will force them to exit through the
narrow Bashi Channel, near the northern edge of the strait. The Luzon Strait
is wide by Mahanian standards, but the Babuyan and Batan Islands complicate
matters, jutting out into the strait off northern Luzon. Seamounts and reefs dot
the waters separating the northern Batanes from Taiwan, compressing traffic into
narrow, somewhat convoluted pathways. This subjects SSBNs and other craft to
detection and, in wartime, attack by hostile submarines, antisubmarine aircraft,
or surface vessels outfitted for antisubmarine warfare.46
Chinese skippers, then, will enjoy deepwater concealment for only part of
their voyages, courting danger immediately upon leaving port and when leaving
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the South China Sea. To compound the problem, they will be compelled to elude
antisubmarine forces operating from Taiwan, Luzon, or more remote sites such as
Japan to reach the Pacific high seas. That is a lot of hazardous underwater terrain
to traverse. The interplay among topography, hydrography, and strategy promises
to take on new salience as PLA Navy commanders confront emerging realities
and their opponents mull how to turn strategic geography to their advantage.
Taiwan, the Northern Sentinel
No appraisal of the South China Sea would be complete without a few words
about the geostrategic characteristics of Taiwan, which abuts the South China
Sea to the north. Comparison between Taiwan and the islands Mahan assessed
is inexact but revealing. Taiwan resembles Cuba by certain Mahanian standards.
In terms of position, it stands athwart north–south sea-lanes that convey raw
materials and finished goods to and from Northeast Asian economies. The island
also overlooks and could obstruct east–west routes. Its northern tip, for example,
faces Yonaguni, the southernmost point in Japan’s Ryukyu island chain. As with
the rest of the Ryukyu straits, land sites adjacent to this narrow sea could be fortified to erect an east–west barrier to Chinese shipping. Also, Taiwan’s southern tip
adjoins the Luzon Strait, the best—though, as shown before, far from optimal—
portal between the western Pacific and the South China Sea.
The island is sizable, albeit smaller and more compact than Cuba. Much as
with Cuba, whoever rules Taiwan enjoys considerable freedom to move forces
overland on interior lines, bypassing and offsetting the debilitating impact of a
blockade. And numerous seaports of various sizes and shapes dot its long coastline. Minor fishing harbors and marinas, along with caverns and other natural
features, could provide ample refuge for flocks of small patrol craft. Larger
naval combatants could operate from such major seaports as Keelung and Kaohsiung.47 From the vantage point of natural resources, verdant Taiwan is reasonably well stocked with foodstuffs and other supplies. Its inhabitants, however,
depend on imported oil and gas. This represents a critical shortfall. On the whole,
however, the island would seem to justify qualified applause from geostrategists.
Yet certain drawbacks recall Mahan’s acerbic commentary on Jamaica, when
juxtaposed to nearby Cuba. Taiwan may flank key SLOCs, but the long Chinese
coastline envelops the island in turn. PLA naval and air forces face the island
along many axes, much as ships based at Cuban ports could interdict shipping
bound to or from Jamaica. Only Taiwanese forces stronger than nearby sea- and
shore-based PLA assets could release the island’s full geostrategic potential in the
face of Chinese enmity. The island’s armed forces, however, are unlikely to regain
their qualitative advantage over the PLA, let alone overwhelm their antagonists
with superior numbers. It would be politically unthinkable for Taipei to reopen
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the island to U.S. or other outside forces—even if external powers declared themselves willing to return and thereby to ratchet up tensions across the Taiwan Strait.
Should the mainland impose its rule on Taiwan, however, the island will
come to resemble Key West, an outpost adjoining important sea-lanes and carrying enormous offensive and defensive potentials for the great power that owns
it.48 This new, old asset would extend China’s seaward reach eastward into the
western Pacific, turn the southern flanks of Japan and South Korea, granting
Beijing newfound geostrategic leverage over its rivals, and emplace PLA forces
in a commanding position along the northern rim of the South China Sea. From
there they could project power westward into the Taiwan Strait, eastward into
the Pacific Ocean, northward along the “first island chain,” or southward into the
Luzon Strait or the South China Sea. Perhaps most importantly, the PLA would
have burst through the island-chain barrier, which Beijing regards as a latter-day
implement of containment and an impediment to east–west movement between
the China seas and the western Pacific.
In operational terms, PLA forces stationed on Taiwan could shield the mainland from prospective adversaries, such as the United States and its allies, regulate
Northeast Asian competitors’ seaborne communications, and guarantee free
access through the Luzon Strait for Chinese men-of-war—including the SSBNs
discussed before—while threatening to interrupt opponents’ access.
Thinking about Taiwan as a geostrategic asset is by no means new. Admiral
Ernest King, the Chief of Naval Operations during World War II, affirmed that
the power that controlled Formosa could “put the cork in the bottle” of the South
China Sea for adversaries. The reciprocal advantage: that power could keep the
bottle uncorked for its own use.49 Analyses like King’s help explain why the United States affixed such value to Taiwan during the Cold War and why China does
today. This “unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender,” to quote General
Douglas MacArthur, helped anchor American containment strategy vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union and China, constraining communist movements up and down the
Asian seaboard.50
Doubters might say that such metaphors represent an antiquarian way of looking at Taiwan. Chinese officialdom evidently disagrees. The important Chinese
manual Science of Military Strategy, for example, constitutes an authoritative
guide to how the PLA leadership views China’s strategic surroundings. “The
reunification of China’s mainland and Taiwan,” its framers declare, is “something
that concerns China’s national sovereignty and territorial sovereignty.” Their appraisal is worth quoting at length. The island, they observe, lies “in the key area”
of maritime communications for East Asia. Sea lines of communication “from the
East China Sea to the South China Sea, from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, as
well as the route from the West Pacific to the Middle East, Europe and Asia pass
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here. [Taiwan] is a sea transportation hub connecting Shanghai and Hong Kong,
Ryukyu and Manila, Yokosuka and Cam Ranh Bay and Strait of Malacca.”51
Gaining control of Taiwan is a matter of immense strategic import for Beijing,
regardless of whether Western commentators concur with Chinese strategists
about the island’s military potential. The Science of Military Strategy authors add:
And [Taiwan] is where we can breach the chain of the islands surrounding us in the
West Pacific . . . as well as a strategic key area and sea barrier for defense and offense.
If Taiwan should be alienated from the mainland, not only our natural maritime
defense system would lose its depth, opening a sea gateway to the outside forces, but
also a large area of water territory . . . will fall into the hands of others. . . . [O]ur line
of foreign trade and transportation . . . will be exposed to the surveillance and threats
of separatist and enemy forces, and China will forever be locked to the west side of the
52
first chain of islands in the West Pacific.

China, they conclude, has “no room for compromise” on this geostrategic
asset. If peaceful methods of cross-strait unification prove ineffective, military
means will be “the only alternative.”53 Nor is this a peculiarly Chinese Communist prognosis. It conforms to long-standing views, including that of Chinese
Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek, who insisted that losing any part of China’s
geographic periphery compromises the integrity of the whole.54 From Beijing’s
perspective, preserving the defensive system warrants the utmost resolve and
effort.
A UNIQUE PERIPHERAL SEA
Finally, two critical differences separate the South China Sea from both the
Caribbean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. First, there are relatively convenient
alternatives to traveling through maritime Southeast Asia. It is possible, that is,
to detour around the South China Sea without undertaking voyages of epic scope
like the ones around Tierra del Fuego or the Cape of Good Hope. The Pacificbased U.S. battleship Oregon was forced to circumnavigate South America in
1898 to get into the Caribbean fight against Spain.55 The battlewagon’s arduous
transit lent credence to Mahanian advocacy on behalf of an isthmian canal. A
few short years later, in 1904–1905, the Russian Baltic Fleet, denied the use of the
Suez Canal, had to steam around Africa, across the Indian Ocean, and through
the South China Sea and waters adjoining Taiwan to engage the Imperial Japanese Navy.56
Distance was clearly a problem in these instances. There was no alternative to
a protracted cruise in the former case, while Japan’s ally Great Britain closed the
Suez to Russia in the latter. Neither geography nor enemy strategy, by contrast,
compels anyone to traverse contemporary Southeast Asian waters. Circumventing this marginal sea imposes significant costs in terms of extra fuel, wear and
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2014

NWC_Spring2014Review.indb 48

19

2/14/14 1:08 PM

Naval War College Review, Vol. 67 [2014], No. 2, Art. 5

HOLMES

49

tear on equipment, and crew fatigue, but such challenges are manageable compared to rounding South America or Africa.
Second, there are potential naval stations outside the southern perimeter of
the South China Sea. Many lie in Australia. Forces based there can swing from
side to side between the Indian Ocean and western Pacific without ever venturing
into Southeast Asia. This qualifies Robert Kaplan’s analogy between the South
China Sea and a throat. A throat is the only route from one place to another,
whereas Australia-based forces enjoy the luxury of entering the South China Sea
at points of their choosing—bypassing the throat.
Australia thus bestrides an invaluable position at the seam between the Pacific
and Indian Oceans, external to Southeast Asia. The U.S.-Australian agreement to
station a rotating contingent of U.S. Marines at Darwin, along the northern Australian coast, leverages this convenient geostrategic reality.57 Also, while Canberra
has demurred thus far, Washington may try to expand the basing arrangement
to stage heavy U.S. Navy forces in Australia, perhaps at the western seaport of
Perth. The merits of an external yet nearby geographic position are too obvious to
ignore. Whether alliance politics will permit a realignment this bold remains to
be seen.58 Much depends on how aggressively China conducts itself in the region.
The South China Sea, then, represents a maritime crossroads that commands
enormous worth for seafaring states while presenting few opportunities for
permanent forward basing. Because of its dearth of island outposts, it will prove
difficult for any would-be hegemon to command—even a coastal state like China
that is replete with maritime potential. An oceangoing fleet able to project power
throughout the region will be a must for any power with designs on sea command. China has achieved impressive progress toward a blue-water navy while
fielding its first coast guard and an imposing array of land-based weaponry able
to strike at sea. This portends well from its standpoint.
Nonetheless, Beijing has taken on an imposing slate of commitments along
its nautical periphery, ranging from managing events on the Korean Peninsula,
to the north, through recovering Taiwan, at the midpoint, to fostering maritime
security at Malacca, to the extreme southwest. These commitments stretch finite
assets thin. China’s naval project remains a work in progress, meaning that any
decision to concentrate assets in Southeast Asia places other, equally pressing
interests at risk. Alfred Thayer Mahan would doubt China’s capacity to enforce
its will in Southeast Asia any time soon.59
Mahan might question America’s longevity there as well—and beseech
American decision makers to shore up its position, both by keeping the U.S. Navy
strong and by courting close ties with regional allies and partners. Otherwise,
the pillars of American sea power in a theater of vital interest may prove wobbly
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indeed. Strategists could do worse than to use his framework to think through
these challenges.
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